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come an open board policy so that prisoners and those assisting them
could be aware and benefit.
"Every prisoner's liberty is of course circumscribed by the very fact
of his confinement but his interest in limited liberty left to him is then
only more substantial. 8' 3 The Second and Seventh Circuits have now
provided the prisoner with a long over-due protection. Prisoners might
at last have an opportunity to understand the nature of their misdeeds
and be truely able to rehabilitate themselves.
DOROTHY

C. BERNHOLZ

Menard v. Saxbe: Real or Imagined Remedy?
The recent decision in Menard v. Saxbe' upheld the right of Dale
Menard to have the record of his 1965 arrest in California removed from
the criminal identification files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Since his arrest, Menard had sought relief from what was termed the
unjustified burden that the record posed to him and to his future.
Even though he had been able to show that his arrest was deemed a
detention only, that no crime had been committed, nor charges brought
against him, Menard had been unable to have his record cancelled
through administrative means. Neither the F.B.I., when apprised of
the change in status, i.e. a dentention rather than an arrest, nor the
local California authorities would act to grant Menard the relief sought,
without court order.
The arrest itself was lawful. The circumstances as related by the
court show Menard to have been 19, a student, visiting in Los Angeles
in August of 1965. Late at night in a local park, police acting on a
report of a prowler in the area, picked up Menard under seemingly
suspicious circumstances, i.e., on a park bench near the area of the
prowler warning. He was held two days without charges filed. Subsequently, after explanations and when the officials were satisfied that
there was no connection with Menard and any report of crime, he was
released. Menard was routinely fingerprinted and under California
procedure, his fingerprints and a record of his arrest and release were
83. Wolff v. McDonnell, -

U.S. -,

94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974)

(Douglas, J., dissent-

ing).
1. 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'g sub nom., Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F.
Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971).
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forwarded to the F.B.I. 2 The notation on the record as forwarded,
read: "Released-Unable to connect with any felony or misdemeanor
at this time. ' 3 Menard, unfortunately, had been found in the wrong
place at the wrong time.
Menard, after discovering that his arrest record had been sent to the
F.B.I., made several requests for its expungement. His family found
that each respective agency, the Los Angeles Police, the California Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was powerless
to act. Aware that the F.B.I., as a central data collecting agency and
a powerful source of information, would make his record available upon
request to federal and state agencies, Menard continued to press for
its removal.
As a result of this pressure, the F.B.I. reviewed his file and agreed
to amend the record to show under "Disposition or Sentence," that his
arrest was deemed a detention only. Thus it read, "in accordance with
849(b)(1)-not deemed an arrest but a detention only." 4 Under authority of CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE 849 (b) (1) (West Supp. 1970) any
officer may release from custody a person arrested without a warrant
when not connected with any crime and thereafter, the arrest "shall not
be deemed an arrest but a detention only." 5 Once the F.B.I. had
amended the file it refused to further act in the matter to remove what
was now asserted by Menard to be a non-criminal file from the Bureau's Criminal Identification Section. Unable to further pursue his
remedy through administrative procedures, still unsatisfied, Menard
brought this action.
The action was brought in federal district court, and tried before
Judge Gesell. 6 The issue of expungement was considered but the
lower court refused to grant the cancellation outright. Though the record developed at the trial showed the arrest to have been based on
probable cause and not itself invalid, the issue of valid arrest or invalid
arrest was not decisive. Rather, the lower court, based on findings that
neither the Federal Bureau nor the federal district court of the District
of Columbia were the proper agencies to decide the issue of whether
the record should be retained, granted only limited relief. Thus, the
district court issued an order running against the F.B.I. which prohibited the dissemination of Menard's record outside of law enforcement
circles.1 The one exception was for the purposes of federal agencies
with whom Menard might in the future seek employment.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

498 F.2d at 1019.
Id.
Id. at 1020.
Id. at n.5.
328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971).
328 F. Supp. at 728.
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The limitation on the use of his file might have sufficed, but for the
passage by Congress of Public Law 92-184,8 in December 1971, which
overruled part of the district court order by providing for the use of
the F.B.I. criminal records by a number of previously unauthorized
agencies, both state and federal. 9
On appeal, Menard pressed for complete expungement of his
amended record from the criminal files of the Federal Bureau. Operation of the F.B.I. system of collecting data on arrests and its system
of dissemination of these records had received a great deal of attention. The system was described at one point as being "out of effective
control."' 10 Its role as a collecting and distributing agency of confidential information was described as having the "capacity for both good
and harm."1 1
The detriment to the individual is easily recognizable anytime such
records contain inaccurate or misleading information. Nor is it remote
that such records may fall into the wrong hands. As put succinctly by
perhaps the utmost authority, "in the hands of an inexpereinced person
who is unfamiliar with its purpose, an 12
F.B.I report unquestionably can
be a dangerous instrument of injustice.
The theories on which Menard based his claim for relief included
arguments that retention of his record by the F.B.I. violated the fourth
and fifth amendments of the Constitution, and "subjects him to harsh
penalties without being accorded due process of the laws. 1" But,
though the court dealt extensively with injuries flowing from the illegal
retention of arrest records, more emphasis was placed on the identification network itself. And the decision to grant expungement of Menard's
record was based on statutory grounds. Thus the constitutional issues
raised by the record in Menard were sidestepped when the end result was
obtainable from a strict construction of the statute under which the
F.B.I. was authorized to maintain its identification system.
The authority under which criminal files were compiled simply precludes keeping on file "as a record of arrest an encounter with police
that has been established not to constitute an arrest."' 4 Thus, the Bureau was not precluded from maintaining Menard's file in its neutral
identification records, but his record must be relieved of its stigma as
a criminal file. And though turning as it did on interpretation of the
8.
9.

Act of Dec. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-184, § 902,85 Stat. 642.
498 F.2d at 1019 n.1.

10. 328 F. Supp. at 727.
11.
12.

498 F.2d at 1027 n.29.
Hoover, The Confidential Nature of F.B.I. Reports, 8 SYRACusE L. REv. 2

(1956) (hereinafter cited as Hoover).
13. 498 F.2d at 1023.
14. Id. at 1030 (footnote omitted).
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key phrase "criminal," the decision nonetheless raised serious questions
regarding the present function of the F.B.I.
As established in the record, the F.B.I. has grown immensely since
its origin, but according to many, it has done so without a concurrent
growth in responsibilities. The authorization to maintain, collect and
disseminate from central identification files is contained in 28 U.S.C.
§ 534.11 As well as granting the authority to receive from and exchange with state sources, the grant also contains provision for cancellation of exchange privileges with these same sources for unauthorized
use of the records. The system itself has developed through use and
practice since the original grant in 1924. Its long-time director, J.
Edgar Hoover, noted in an early article, that while the Bureau's "jurisdiction has progressively increased, its role as an impartial investigative agency has remained unchanged."' 16 Impartiality may be one of
the touchstones of the problem confronted by Menard. Another, suggested by the title of the above article, is the confidentiality of the
F.B.I. files. The records kept by the Bureau currently number over
200 million cards, of which 19 million are in a separate criminal identification category. 17 Contributing agencies number approximately
8,000. The Bureau in 1970, received for processing about "29,000
fingerprint cards daily, of which 13,000 were arrest submissions ....
The Bureau has no way of checking these submissions for accuracy, nor
does it make any attempt to do so, only requiring that the form card be
properly completed to be included in the data bank. It is not part of the
system to double check accuracy or to request follow up information
from the local submitting agencies. The records do not reflect any certain degree of accuracy and may be totally erroneous, yet if properly submitted by the contributing agencies -they are filed according to normal
procedures. There is inherent in this procedure no certain method of
determining what percentage of information retained in the data banks
is irrelevant, inaccurate or incomplete.
Once filed, only the contributing agency may request a file's return
from the data bank. It is the Bureau's policy to grant a request for
return without question. This is done routinely, but very few requests
-over 6,000 in 1970-are made.'
It is also the Bureau's policy to
15.

28 U.S.C. 534 (1970).

General authority is contained in 534(a), (1) and (2),

(a) The Attorney General shall(1) acquire, collect, classify and preserve identification, criminal identification
; and
(2) exchange these records with and for the use of, authorized officials of the Fed-

eral Government, the States, cities, and penal and other institutions.
16. Hoover at 3.
17. 498 F.2d at 1021.
18. Id. at 1022.
19. Id.
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retain the record even where the record itself shows the arrestee to
This practice is based
have been "released without being charged."2
on the policy that only the contributing agency has the authority to request removal of a record from the criminal files. The Bureau makes
no independent decisions regarding individual records whatsover. The
exception involves records which have been generated by the F.B.I.
itself.
The record illustrates the basic flaws in such a system of mindless
retention and indiscriminate collection. Nothing is discarded and evis
erything is retained. An individual's own inquiry about his record 21
simply referred to the agency which submitted the report originally.
Thus, the result is the bureaucratic standoff which Menard confronted.
Jurisdiction, however, over F.B.I. records and their expungement,
does not ordinarily rest with the federal district court in the District of
Columbia. Jurisdiction, as emphasized by the entire record, is thought
properly to rest in local courts, i.e., in the jurisdiction in which an arrest was made. Menard's cause of action was cognizable by the district
court on the basis of the role of the Bureau, in energizing the record
keeping system. Thus where Menard "attacks abuses of the Identification Division in its unique role in the information network, suit
against the Bureau is proper. "22
The decision attacks what is termed the very "passive role" the F.B.I.
has sought to maintain regarding the accuracy of its records. Thus,
once Menard had shown that his record was no longer one of arrest,
but rather a detention, and not criminal in nature, the Bureau could
not ignore that claim. Its function to maintain its files "carries with
it as a corrollary the responsibility to discharge this function reliably
and responsibly and without unnecessary harm to individuals whose
rights have been invaded. 2 3 The F.B.I.'s function is to maintain "reliably informative" records. When it becomes obvious that an individual's record on file is not reliable, then the Bureau has a responsibility
to correct such a record.
Menard is illustrative of the conflict in decisions in this field. Problems with the form of relief sought, with jurisdiction, and with the
theories on which to base a cause of action are only a few inherent
in this area. Differing results from similar theories, make a cause of
action for expungement of a record an uncertain one.
This uncertainty in the law of expungement has evolved from conflicting policy considerations. These are represented first by the as20. Id. at 1020.
21. Id. at 1022.
22. Id. at 1026.
23. Id.
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serted and rational need of law enforcement personnel to record and
maintain files of fingerprints as well as photographic evidence for identification in criminal matters. Opposed are the rights of the individual,
his right to privacy and to be free from official interference.
In general, public policy favors retention of records on two grounds:
(1) identification of an accused as one who committed the crime
with which he is charged; and (2) the identification of an accused as
the same person who has been charged with or convicted of other
crimes.2 4 Additionally these records may serve a useful purpose in the
apprehension of escaped prisoners. 2 These purposes deal solely with
law enforcement functions and their rationalization needs little explanation or enlargement. These policies may assume at the least, a lawful
arrest, and at the most a conviction of the defendant.
Problems arise when an individual is never charged with any crime,
or is arrested by mistake, or acquitted after trial, etc. His records may
serve no useful law enforcement function as criminal identification.
Yet it has been the practice and belief generally that an "innocent person arrested through mistake has no right to have cancelled a record
of the arrest."2 6 This is sometimes justified by the view that the record actually reflects a "fact." The practice rests primarily on the
theory which holds that a court of equity has no power to correct or
cancel a record which is correct and lawfully made. The policy reflects
a determination that a fact exists, i.e., an arrest, and does not reflect
a consideration of the merits of a particular case.
Early decisions in this field refused to grant expungement on the
basis of this policy and concurrently on the right of law enforcement officials to take and retain fingerprint identification of individuals
held on criminal charges.2 7 According to 76 C.J.S. Record § 29, there
was no right to cancellation of a public record "made in compliance
with a Statute. 2 8 Often in these cases, courts were able to rely on
ultimate relief to an innocent person through further statutory relief.
In United States v. Kelly,2" the court relied on a federal statute which
required an identification record to be made on an accused, but also
provided that the record was not to be made public before trial; and
that further provided for the destruction or return of the record to the
24.
25.
26.
27.

Anno. 83 A.L.R. 127 (1933).
6 C.J.S. Arrest § 17c(2) (1937).
66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and Recording Laws § 9 (1973).
See, e.g., Coppock v. Reed, 189 Iowa 581, 178 N.W. 382 (1920); Mollineux v.

Collins, 177 N.Y. 395, 69 N.E. 727 (1904); United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 (2nd
Cir. 1932); also, Down v. Swann, 111 Md. 53, 73 At. 653 (1909).

28. 76 C.J.S. Records § 29 (1952).
29. 55 F.2d 67 (2nd Cir. 1932).
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individual if he was discharged without conviction. Innocent persons
were thus protected from either publication or misuse of their record.
In contrast, and as a corrollary to the right to make and retain a criminal identification record, is the right of an individual never convicted
of any crime to the cancellation of his police record, recognized in
In Itzkovitch v. Whitaker,"' which considered poother jurisdictions."
lice use of the defendant's photograph in a "rogue's gallery," an injunction was held proper to prevent the photograph from being used in the
future by the police department.
Much of the controversy can be clarified by distinguishing between
the mere retention of an arrest record and the later use and dissemination of such a record. Further use of an innocent citizens record "by
publication and circulation" may have constituted a libel at one time. 2
Justification for removal of a record rests on their nature and uses
for other than law enforcement purposes. In remanding Menard originally, Judge Bazelon enumerated some common disabilities which
flow from knowledge of an arrest.3
Far reaching injuries, perhaps totally unjustified, concern economic
losses, opportunity losses and social losses. Thus, opportunities for
schooling, employment, or professional licenses may be restricted or
folnonexistent as a consequence of the mere fact of an arrest, even if
34
lowed by acquittal of complete exoneration of the charges involved.
As to further investigation by law enforcement officials, an arrest
record may mean that an individual may be the first to be questioned
in any subsequent investigation,and perhaps the last to be absolved of
suspicion. Police may use the information to support decisions on
later arrests, on
whether to exercise their discretion to bring formal charges against an
individual already arrested. Arrest records have been used in deciding whether to allow a defendant to present his story without impeachment by prior convictions, and as a basis for denying release prior to
trial or appeal; or they may be considered by35 a judge in determining
the sentence to be given a convicted offender.
It is not known how often this information receives circulation out30. See, Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 117 La. 708, 42 So. 228 (1906); Schulman v.
Whitaker, 117 La. 704, 42 So. 227 (1906).
31. 117 La. 708, 42 So. 228 (1906).
32. 6 C.J.S. Arrest § 17c(2) (1937).
33. Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 490-492 (D.C. Cir. 1970), remanded 328 F.
Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971) (limited relief granted), rev'd sub nom., Menard v. Saxbe, 498
F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (expungement ordered).
34. Id. at 490 (footnote omitted).

35. Id. at 491 (footnotes omitted).
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side of law enforcement areas, but it is recognized that it occurs. 6 The
procedures followed by the F.B.I. do not involve systematic follow-up
on possible unauthorized use of information received from them. The
Bureau itself admits to little supervision over "contributing agency
uses."3 7 Complaints, received by the F.B.I. regarding such misuse, receive little in the way of attention or investigation unless the Bureau
receives "a direct complaint . . . of which there are about four or five
a year ... "38
When a complaint is recognizable in law, an unconscionable use is
neither condoned nor tolerated. A record of arrest alone may not be
the basis for discrimination in employment.39 It is said that the mere
record of an arrest, without conviction, has no probative force of its
own. For, "under our system of criminal justice, only a conviction carries legal significance as to a person's involvement in criminal behavior. '' 0 Yet an individual is required in a number of instances to give information regarding an arrest, such as appliants for admission to the Bar
in the State of North Carolina. In a number of areas individuals are required to be fingerprinted as a condition of licensing or employment.4 1
The challenge to retention of arrest records and to records of convictions has been the subject of no little effort in recent years and such
challenges have met with some success. Equitable relief has been
deemed proper in a number of circumstances. Illustrative are cases
which have dealt with arrests made without probable cause, arrests
made incident to systematic police harrassment, and arrests made during civil disorders. Unusual circumstances, as indicated above, have
been the common denominator in the cases in which the remedy of
expungement has most often been granted.
It has been thought by some that only an illegal arrest could be subject to the remedy of expungement. 41 In Hughes v. Rizzo, 4 the petitioners brought suit to expunge all records of their arrest from any local
law enforcement agencies and return of all files from any receiving
agencies. On the basis of finding that the arrests were without prob36. 498 F.2d at 1024.

37. Id. at 1026.
38. Id. n.28.
39. Gregory v. Litton, 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970); cited in Menard v.
Saxbe, 328 F. Supp. at 724.
40. 328 F. Supp. at 724.
41. See, 328 F. Supp. at 728. Every applicant for a license to practice medicine
in Nevada; every applicant for admission to the North Carolina Bar; all real estate brokers in the State of Idaho.
42. 328 F. Supp. at 724. See, Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Penn.

1968); United States v. Rosen, 343 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v.
Dooley, 364 F. Supp. 75 (D.D.C. 1973).
43. 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Penn. 1968).
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able cause and solely for the purposes of harassment of the petitioners,
hippies, the order was granted. Police misconduct formed a major part
of the decision. Petitioners' arrests led to no charges, and police questioning admittedly was unconcerned with any alleged criminal activities.
In cases such as Hughes and Sullivan v. Murphy,4 4 police procedures
were relevant and decisive. Sullivan involved thousands of arrests during the 1971 May Day demonstrations against the Vietnam War, in the
District of Columbia. The petitioners, brought the action for expungement of their records in the form of a class action.
Sullivan focuses upon many of the problems that both parties must
have dealt with. That is, plaintiffs in the suit were able to show that
a great proportion of the arrests made during the demonstrations were
made indiscriminately and without probable cause. The claim for relief was predicated on the showing that the arrests were unlawful and
in violation of federal constitutional rights. On the other hand, police
officials attempted to justify their procedures during the demonstration
on the basis of the emergency situation. Normal procedures had been
followed initially, and proper field arrest forms were completed in
many situations.
However, formal arrest and booking procedures did actually break
down in the field, in part from necessity and in part due to mistaken
directives. Many of those arrested were subjected to only dragnet arrest procedures, or mass arrests with little or no information concerning
criminal conduct known to police officials. Yet most arrestees were
subjected to fingerprinting and an arrest file. When later determining whether to prosecute for disorderly conduct, the most common offense for which there had been arrests, the officials were simply unable
to identify the arrested person with the officer who had initiated the arrest, with witnesses able to testify or with any criminal activity whatsoever. Many of the cases were dismissed, many resulted in acquittals,
and in a great number of instances charges were simply never filed.
As a result, thousands of persons were thus subjected to criminal
identification records, without a single charge having been filed against
them. Granted that both the innocent and the guilty had been swept
into the criminal justice system, the court in Sullivan took the position
that the burden was therefore shifted to law enforcement officials to
justify inclusion of the members of the class into the criminal identification files by connection with criminal conduct on their part. 45
On the basis of the circumstances of the arrest, the court found that
44. 478 F.2d 938 (1973).
45. Id. at 970.
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"federal courts have not only jurisdiction to hear and determine claims
of deprivation and threatened deprivation of rights guaranteed by the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments but also judicial authority to use their
remedial mechanisms to redress or obviate such constitutional injuries."4 6 Accordingly, expungement was ordered in those cases where
no probable cause could be shown to justify the arrest, as where officials were unable to even produce an arrest form from which a determination as to the legality of the arrest could be made. Thus, Sullivan
was compelled to follow the traditional approach in that relief through
expungement of an arrest record was "an appropriate remedy in the
wake of police action in violation of constitutional rights." 7
Other examples involving infringement of constitutional rights are
found in situations where it is determined that "local law" has been
"invoked solely for the purpose of harrassment."45 Full relief has included not only expungement of the record of arrest but convictions
as well.4 9 In United States v. McLeod,5" a case involving alleged interference in voter registration drives and police harassment, the arrests
and prosecutions were found illegal and in violation of the Civil Rights
Act of 1957.51 The remedy of expungement was felt best suited to
"see that as far as possible the persons who were arrested and prosecuted in violation of section 197 1(b) are placed in the position
in which
52
they would have stood had the county not acted unlawfully.
The same results have been achieved where an attack was made upon
the constitutionality of a statute under which defendants were harassed
and prosecuted by local police. In Wheeler v. Goodman,53 a North
Carolina statute was found unconstitutional as too vague and overbroad,
punishing "status" rather than criminal behavior. The defendants
were "hippies" and subjected to unlawful arrest; at the very least the
police were unable to discover any evidence of criminal conduct.54 Expungement of their arrest records was ordered on the theory that since
they had committed no crime, their records could serve no useful purpose, and were of no value in future criminal investigations. And
though the court in Wheeler recognized as the general rule "that an
equity court should not order expunction unless extreme circumstances
46. Id. at 965.
47. Id. at 968.
48. United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1967). Also see,
Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
49. See, cases cited note 48 supra. See also, Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D.
211 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
50. 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b) (1957).
52. United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d at 749.
53. 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969),

4. Id. at 60,
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exist,"55 the underying facts as obvious from the record, justified the
equitable remedy.
Jurisdiction over expungement of a record has been held proper on
the basis of a theory of ancillary jurisdiction, in the District of Columbia. The question of jurisdiction arose before the court sitting in criminal session in Morrow v. District of Columbia.5 6 In a decision limited
in scope to the District of Columbia, J. Skelly Wright, Circuit Judge
upheld broad use of "ancillary equitable jurisdiction" by the lower
court. In upholding the order to expunge a record, the court expressed
broad discretionary powers,
the major purpose of ancillary jurisdiction . . .is to insure that a
judgment of a court is given full effect; ancillary orders will issue
when a party's actions, whether directly or57indirectly threaten to compromise ,the effect of the court's judgment.
The general view, however, probably remains unchanged, in that
without unusual or extreme circumstances, expungement is not properly
granted.5 8 The remedy may not at this time extend to every arrest
that does not lead to conviction; but it is certain that courts have the
inherent power to grant full relief when equity requires that it be
given. Thus in a recent decision, the court could say, "that any challenge to the inherent power of a federal court to enter an order expunging arrest records is foreclosed by prior decision.""
It is difficult to place Menard in perspective, in light of the traditional
theories on which expungements have been granted. Menard could not
show basic flaws in the initiation of his file, i.e., no infringement of
his fourth and fifth amendment rights. Nor does the relief granted
in his case rest on the generally accepted theories for which expungements have been ordered. A look at the limitations of the decision
may help to clarify some of these inconsistencies.
It should be noted that the decision considered only the unique role
played by the F.B.I. within the context of screening and therefore
maintaining reasonably accurate files. Thus its duty to correct or cancel that which is brought to its attention. Though the duty is not absolute and liability does not flow from maintaining incorrect or inaccurate data, per se, their responsibility regarding the screening of information received is simply not one which the F.B.I. can pass off or
ignore. But only when made aware of inaccuracies or when put on
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 65.
417 F.2d 728 (1969).
Id. at 740.
See, cases cited note 42 supra.
Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. at 213.

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1975

11

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 [1975], Art. 16

338

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL

notice of possible inaccuracies does the Bureau have the duty to make
independent inquiry.
First, Menard's attack was not directed at the making of arrest records, but rather on their wholesale distribution. What was initially a
local police matter, and which proved to be an unfortunate incident of
no consequence, was to be broadcast on a national scale.
Secondly, once aware of the possible consequences of widespread
dissemination of his data sheet, the problem becamse one of remedies.
If, within the accepted pattern, he could not show that the underlying
causes of his arrest were in violation of constitutional rights, he was
without a remedy altogether.
Two developments proved decisive to his success. The first obviously was the California decision to regard his arrest as a detention with
noncriminal implications. The second was the failure on the part of
both the F.B.I. and significantly, the California authorities to make allowances for evaluation of a file once it has been initiated.
The emphasis then became the reponsibilities of the F.B.I. to act to
expunge a record from its criminal files when apprised that the record
contains noncriminal information. The practice of the agency to claim
that it is powerless to act without a formal request for return of a record, under the circumstances, is specifically disapproved.6" Justification
for the disapproval came from a determination that though "the Congressional program contemplates a major role for local authorities, it
does not contemplate Bureau abdication to the local authorities."' '
CONCLUSION

Future actions for expungement of an arrest record may receive
more generous treatment. Though the Court of Appeals based its decision on statutory grounds, rather than on a weighing of the merits of
retaining records of dubious value, the emphasis unmistakably moves
in this direction. Though it is not impossible to forecast a movement
in the direction contemplated in Menard towards direct confrontation,
one warning is clear. Jurisdiction is a primary concern; thus expungement proceedings should be initiated where the arrest took place. This
procedure alone promises the fullest relief possible under all of the circumstances.
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